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ARGUMENT 
THE SEIZURE OF JUMA WAS WITHOUT REASONABLE 
ARTICULABLE SUSPICION OF ANY VIOLATION OF ACTUAL LAW 
I. The State Misapplies the Case Law as it Applies to the Facts of This 
Case- The Traffic Stop was Without Reasonable Articulable Suspicion 
of any Violations of Law. 
Both the Appellant, Ramon Juma and the Appellee rely upon the case of 
State v. Applegate, 2008 UT 63, 194 P.3d 925 in arguing their respective positions. 
Since it is clear that the correct interpretation of Applegate is essential to a proper 
determination in the case at bar, this Reply Memorandum will focus upon 
Applegate and the parties' respective arguments based thereon. 
A. The State's Arguments are Based Upon an 
Incomplete Reading of the Decision in Applegate. 
The State's argument that the officer's illegal seizure of Juma was in fact a 
legal seizure are based entirely upon a reading of Applegate that omits language 
that is key to an accurate understanding of the holding found in that case. The state 
argues that Trooper Bowles1 incorrect belief in what constituted a specific traffic 
violation, was "subjective" and therefore cannot be considered in determining 
whether the stop was justified. This argument has some seeming merit until one 
reads the entire decision contained in Applegate. 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The State argues that Trooper Bowles1 incorrect belief that the driver of 
Defendant's vehicle had violated a traffic law by failing to make a lane change to 
the adjacent, unoccupied left lane of the freeway when approaching and overtaking 
UDOT maintenance vehicles with their yellow lights flashing, is inconsequential 
because Bowles subjectively believed that such conduct was a violation of the 
traffic code. Although completely wrong in his belief, the State argues that 
Bowles1 belief was reasonable, therefore the seizure of Defendant's vehicle was 
likewise reasonable. 
Yet the State also argues, correctly, that the Trooper's subjective intent and 
thoughts are irrelevant to the reasonable suspicion inquiry, as well as an improper 
basis for invalidating an arrest. See Devenpeck v Alford, 543 U.S. 146 at 154-55, 
125 S.Ct. 588; State v. Friesen, 1999 UT App 262, ]f 12, 988 P.2d 7. The State 
ignores, however, the remaining portion of the ruling: " . . . that reasonable, 
articulable suspicion must be supported by what the law actually is, not what the 
officer subjectively thought the law was. In other words, if the defendant's conduct 
gives the officer reasonable, articulable suspicion," ' the fact that the officer does 
not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the 
legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action as long as 
the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.'" Devenpeck 543 U.S. 
a Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
at 153, 125 S.Ct. 588 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 
S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Applegate 
2008UT63y*h\l. 
Bowies' only stated reasons for stopping and detaining Defendant's vehicle is 
that the driver failed to make a lane change where no lane change was required, 
and that Bowies' subjectively believed that this failure to change lanes threatened 
the safety of the UDOT workers (ignoring the semi-tractor-trailer ahead of 
Defendant's vehicle, which also failed to change lanes and constituted a much 
larger safety threat). Memorandum Decision of Trial Court. R. 65-75. The Trial 
Court specifically found that Trooper Bowles testified at both the Preliminary 
Hearing and the Evidentiary Hearing that he stopped Defendants because they 
failed to move over to the left lane for an emergency vehicle. Id. 
B. Because Juma Did Not Violate any Law, 
His Detention was Illegal in its Inception. 
The actual traffic law here does not require changing lanes while passing 
UDOT vehicles off the side of the freeway with yellow lights flashing. The 
Defendant's vehicle did not change lanes, which cannot give rise to suspicion of 
violating this section, because this section does not require such conduct. Under 
the State's analysis, an officer, for example, could stop a vehicle and seize it and it's 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
driver and occupants, if the officer believed, albeit incorrectly, that Utah law 
requires that the vehicle headlights must be turned on at sunset, where the law in 
Utah actually requires headlights beginning 30 minutes after sunset1. The officer 
would be wrong on the law, but his factual observation that the headlights were not 
on is undisputed, and his mistaken understanding of the applicable law apparently 
does not matter, under the State's analysis. 
In this case, the officer incorrectly believes the law requires a lane change, 
and the defendant's vehicle does not make a lane change. The State argues that the 
officer acts reasonably and with an articulated suspicion of a violation of the law 
(that the defendant's car should have changed lanes) because under the totality of 
all circumstances, a reasonable person could conclude that stopping a vehicle is 
reasonable so long as the officer believed it was reasonable. This circular argument 
misstates and misapplies the ruling in Applegate. 
CONCLUSION 
This Reply Brief of Defendant does not further address the remaining issues 
raised in his appeal and submits those issues as already briefed. 
The State's analysis of Applegate is flawed and erroneous. The correct 
141-6a-1603. Lights and illuminating devices — Duty to display — Time. 
(1) (a) The operator of a vehicle shall turn on the lamps or lights of the vehicle on a highway 
at any time from a half hour after sunset to a half hour before sunrise and at any other time when, 
due to insufficient light or unfavorable atmospheric conditions, persons and vehicles on the 
highway are not clearly discernible at a distance of 1,000 feet ahead. 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
application of Applegate entails a finding that the reasonable, articulable 
suspicion must be supported by what the law actually is, not what the officer 
imagined it to be. Because Trooper Bowles stopped the Defendant's vehicle for 
conduct that is not violative of any law, the detention was illegal at its inception. 
This Court should therefore reverse the trial court's decision and instruct the trial 
court to suppress the unlawfully obtained evidence. 
Il4(h 
Edward D. Flint 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
5 
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^'XTH DISTRICT COW1" 
immK-k ?nu-\s 
CLERK 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SEVIER COUNTY 
895 East 300 North, Richfield, Utah 84?6l 
Telephone: (435) 896-2700; Facsimile: (435) 896-8047 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff; 
vs. 
RAMON A. JUMA, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DIAMOND K. FLYNN, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
Case No. 091600075 
091600076 
Assigned Judge: Wallace A. Lee 
On 11 August 2009, Defendant Juma filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence. On 28 August 
2009, Defendant Flynn filed a Notice of Joinder in Motion to Suppress, joining Defendant 
Juma'sfootiori On or about 22 September 2009, Defendant Juma filed Defendant's 
Supplemental Memorandum Regarding Evidence Suppression. 
Also, On 22 September 2009 the Court conducted an evidentiary suppression hearing. On 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants1 
i IIMllllIIiiiiHv Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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17 November 2009, the State filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress. On 6 January 2009, Defendant Juma filed a request to stibmit for decision. 
This motion is now ready for a decision. 
DECISION 
Defendants' Motion to Suppress Evidence should be denieeL 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On 31 March 2009, at approximately 9:30 a.m., Trooper Nick Bowles, with the Utah 
Highway Patrol was conducting traffic patrol on Interstate 70 near Salina, Utah. 
2. Trooper Bowles was in the median near mile post 58, approximately one quarter-mile 
east of the Salina on-ramp. 
3. Trooper Bowles observed a black, four-door Chevrolet sedaii enter the freeway behind a 
semi-trailer going eastbound. Both the semi and the black Chevrolet remained in the right 
(outside) lane as they passed several Utah Department of Transportation maintenance 
vehicles on the side of the road. The left (inside) lane was Ufloccupied. 
4. Trooper Bowles did not see either vehicle move over in their lane or even crowd the 
center line. 
5. The UDOT crew was on the south side of the freeway apptibximately a quarter mile past 
the on ramp. The UDOT crew appeared to be replacing a rdMside sign. There were 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATE v. JUMA, Case No. 091600075 
STATE v. FLYNN, Case No. 091600076 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion to Suppress 
Page 3 
several vehicles on the gravel shoulder and one was up on the shoulder, partially on the 
pavement Trooper Bowles felt it was dangerous to the safety of the UDOT workers for 
the black Chevrolet not to move over as it passed. At that point, Trooper Bowles decided 
to stop the black Chevrolet vehicle. 
6. At both the preliminary hearing and the suppression hearing Trooper Bowles testified he 
stopped the black Chevrolet for failure to move over for an emergency vehicle. 
7. Defendant Juma was in the front passenger seat of the black Chevrolet, which he had 
rented, and Defendant Flynn was driving. 
8. As Trooper Bowles approached the black Chevrolet vehicle* he could see there were only 
two occupants. The luggage compartment of the vehicle w&s visible as the trooper 
approached and he immediately noticed that the entire rear portion of the vehicle was 
filled with luggage. In Trooper Bowies' experience, the amdunt of luggage in the vehicle 
was excessive for two people. 
9. Trooper Bowles made contact with Defendants who seemed unusually nervous and even 
frantic. Their hands were shaking as they retrieved their identifying documents and 
handed them to the trooper. 
10. Trooper Bowles obtained identification for both Defendants which showed the driver, 
"r* 
Flynn, was from Michigan and the passenger, Juma, was from Kansas. The vehicle was a ^o 
CD 
CD 
- * - • • 
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rental and had been rented in Nebraska. Trooper Bowles testified that in his training and 
experience it is common in drug trafficking situations for th£ participants and vehicles to 
all be from different states. 
11. Trooper Bowles then spoke with both defendants separately* Their stories about their 
travel together did not match and this caused Trooper Bowles further concern. 
12. At about this time, Trooper Bowles received informationfrom dispatch indicating 
Defendant Juma had a previous criminal history involving drugs. 
13. Trooper Bowles then gave Flynn a written warning notice, returned her identification 
card and then, as she started to leave, Trooper Bowles asked if he could talk to her a little 
more. Flynn agreed to speak to Trooper Bowles. 
14. Trooper Bowles told Flynn about the things he had noticed during the course of the stop 
that caused him to suspect drugs. He asked if he could search the vehicle. Flynn told 
Trooper Bowles he would have to speak to Mr. Juma because he was the person who 
rented the vehicle. Trooper Bowles then asked Juma for permission to search and Juma 
Refused. 
15. At this point, Trooper Bowles decided to deploy his trained canine. At the time, Trooper 
Bowles was a certified canine handler. The dog was also a trained and certified drug 
oo 
detection dog. As Trooper Bowles took the dog around Defendants' vehicle, the dog uD 
O 
CD 
CD 
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alerted, indicating drugs in the rear of the vehicle, and at the right, rear bumper, then the 
dog more aggressively indicated the presence of drugs by barking and scratching on the 
rear passenger door of the vehicle. 
16. Based on this indication by the canine, Trooper Bowles decided to search the vehicle 
where he discovered marijuana on the floorboard, near the fear passenger door, and in the 
rear of the vehicle. 
ANALYSIS 
The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches land seizures, shall not be 
violated . . ."UnitedStates v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,550 (U.S. 1980). 
The Court first considers whether there was a seizure and subsequent search. The Court 
concludes there was a seizure because stopping an automobile and the resulting detention is a 
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. State v. 
Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
The^Jtah Court of Appeals in State v. Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155,157-158 (Utah Ct App. 
1992), held, "the stopping of an automobile is constitutionally justified if the stop is incident to a 
lawful citation for a traffic violation." The central issue in this motion is whether Trooper 
Bowles had a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Defendants' vehicle. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Defendants argue Trooper Bowles did not have reasonable suspicion to stop them. 
Trooper Bowles stopped their vehicle because it failed to move over and change lanes while 
approaching and passing the UDOT crew on the eastbound right shoulder of Interstate 70. 
Defendants argue there is no requirement for the driver of a vehicle to change lanes when 
passing a highway maintenance vehicle. 
The State argues that Defendants' vehicle did not slow down, move over, or change lanes 
and thus Defendant Flynn violated Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6a~904(3), and created a 
dangerous situation for the UDOT crews. However, Trooper Bowles testified at both the 
Preliminaiy Hearing and the Evidentiaiy Hearing that he stopped defendants because they failed 
to move over to the left lane for an emergency vehicle.1 The UDOT vehicles with their amber 
colored lights flashing are not "authorized emergency vehicles. "2 The UDOT vehicles with their 
amber lights flashing are governed by Utah Code Ann. Section 41*6a-904(3) which states: "The 
operator of a vehicle, upon approaching a stationary tow truck or highway maintenance vehicle 
that is displaying flashing amber lights, shall: (a) reduce the speed of the vehicle; and (b) provide 
Ujtah Code Ann. Section 41-6a-904(2) states: "The operator of a vehicle, upon approaching a stationary 
authorized emergency vehicle that is displaying alternately flashing red, red and white, or red and blue lights, shall; 
... (c) if traveling in a lane adjacent to the stationary authorized emergency vehicle and if practical, with due regard 
to safety and traffic conditions, make a lane change into a lane not adjacent to the authorized emergency vehicle. 
2 
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6a-102 defines "Authorized emergency vehicle" as fire department vehicles; 
police vehicles; ambulances; and other publicly or privately owned vehicles designated by the commissioner of the 
Department of Public Safety. 
;:4 
7 
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as much space as practical to the stationary tow truck or highway maintenance vehicle." 
In this case, the Court finds Trooper Bowles made a good fkith mistake. He testified that 
he stopped Defendants* vehicle for failure to move over for an emergency vehicle. He 
mistakenly thought there had been a violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 41 -6a-904(2). 
However, the UDOT vehicles are not "authorized emergency vehicles." Therefore, Section 41-
6a-904(3) applies in this case. Section 41-6a-904(3) does not requite motorists to change lanes 
when approaching and passing highway maintenance vehicles. Rather, motorists are only 
required to reduce speed and provide space for the maintenance vehicle. 
In a similar case, State v. Applegate, 194 P.3d 925, 931 (Utah 2008), the Utah Supreme 
Court held, "[m officer's] subjective understanding of the law is irrelevant Instead, all that 
matters is that [the officer is] able to point to specific and articulable facts regarding [a suspect's] 
conduct which, taken together with rational inferences, created a reasonable suspicion of a 
violation of the traffic laws." See also, State v. Friesen, 988 P.2d 7 (Ut App 1999). 
In this case, the Court finds that though Trooper Bowles obviously made a mistake about 
the specific traf^c law involved, he still had a reasonable articulable suspicion Defendants had 
committed a traffic violation. Trooper Bowles knew Defendant Flynn failed to move over when 
approaching and passing the UDOT crew. Trooper Bowles testified he believed this created a 
dangerous condition and constituted a violation of traffic laws sufficient to make a stop. . 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In other words, the Court finds no evidence to suggest Trooper Bowles stopped 
Defendants for a contrived or improper purpose. Instead, he had a reasonable articulable 
suspicion that Defendants had violated a traffic law. His subjective understanding (or 
misunderstanding) of the law is irrelevant Therefore, the Court finds the initial stop and 
detention of Defendants in this case was lawful. 
The next issue in this case is whether the continued detention and questioning of 
Defendants after termination of the initial traffic stop was justified by additional reasonable 
suspicion. After carefully considering all the evidence, the Court concludes Trooper Bowles had 
reasonable articulable suspicion of more serious criminal activity. 
Though many of the traditional factors which typically lead to a finding of reasonable 
suspicion, such as unusual odor, vehicle alterations or physical indications of impairment, are 
absent in this case, the Court finds the following articulated facts sufficient to establish 
reasonable suspicion in the totality of the circumstances: (1) Defendants were both from 
different states and the car was rented in a third state; (2) there was an inordinate amount of 
luggage f<?r two people; (3) Defendants were both unusually nervous; (4) Defendants' stories 
* % • . -
about the-course and timetable of their travel did not match; and (5) dispatch reported Defendant 
Juma had a criminal history which included drug offenses. 
None of these factors, on their own, is enough for reasonable suspicion. However, 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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viewing them in the totality of the circumstances facing Trooper Bowles at the time of the stop, 
the Court finds they are enough to justify further detention to ask abbut drugs and to seek 
permission to search the vehicle. The Court finds the resulting detention reasonably related in 
scope to the initial detention. At that point, the Court finds Trooper Bowles also had reasonable 
suspicion to deploy his narcotics dog to sniff the exterior of the vehicle. 
The Court finds the additional detention was not unduly lefogthy or unreasonable, nor did 
it occur at an unreasonable place or time. After the dog indicated the presence of drugs, the 
Court finds Trooper Bowles had probable cause not only to continue and expand the detention, , 
but to search the vehicle without a warrant 
It is well settled that exposure to a trained canine does not constitute a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it does not expose nod-contraband items that would 
otherwise be hidden from public view. United State v. Place, 462 U*S. 696, 707 (U.S. 1983); 
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,409 (U.S. 2005). However, once a narcotics dog indicates the 
presence of narcotics, the police have probable cause to conduct a search. United States v. Stone, 
866 F.2d 3^9,364 (10th Cir. 1989). 
Indeed, the Utah Court of Appeals has held "the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement provides that m[i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it . 
1 > 
contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment... permits police to search the vehicle without a 
CD 
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For the reasons listed above, Defendant Juma and Defendant Flynn's Motion to Suppress 
is denied. The Clerk is directed to set this case for a scheduling conference. 
I 
< 
more.'" State v. Despain, 173 P.3d 213,217 (Utah Ct. App. 2007), (quoting Maryland v. Dyson, 
527 U.S. 465,467,119 S. Ct. 2013,144 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1999). 
Therefore, die Court concludes that based upon die strong indication by the canine in this 
I 
case, Trooper Bowles had sufficient probable cause to search the vehicle. Accordingly, M 
Defendants' Motion to Suppress should be denied % 
CONCLUSION AfTO ORDER % 
i 
« 
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• Edward Flint 
Jonathon Grimes 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
D Douglas Neeley 
Attorney for Defendant Flynn 
P.O. Box 7 
Manti, Utah 84642 
Method 
W Mail 
• Hand delivery 
• Fax 
• Courthouse box 
i/ Mail 
D Hand delivery 
• Fax 
• Courthouse box 
Dale Eyre 
Sevier County Attorney 
835 East 300 North, Ste. 100 
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